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ABSTRACT 
Currently, there is no organization specifically designed to accomplish the U.S. 
military strategy in counterinsurgency. This thesis uses organizational theory to 
assess the qualities and structure of the Organization for Community 
Engagement (OCE), an organization designed to accomplish the key tenets of 
counterinsurgency. It presents an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine, classic 
and contemporary counterinsurgency theorists, current U.S. military strategy, and 
the environment and its application to Afghanistan as a case study. Based on 
that emerging strategy, the authors develop an organizational design heuristic for 
establishing an organization focused on the fulfillment of that strategy. They then 
apply the heuristic to identify and measure the contingency factors of the OCE. 
Applying these contingency factors to the structural configuration of the OCE, the 
authors propose an organizational configuration that can successfully accomplish 
the COIN aspects of the military strategy in Afghanistan. The authors propose 
that specially trained and selected teams focused on long-term socio-cultural 
relations will fill a critical void in the military’s current community engagement 
efforts and would lead to a more efficient use of military force and U.S. 
resources. 
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A.  THESIS RELEVANCE 
President Obama raised serious questions December 1, 2009 regarding 
the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan by announcing that the country would be 
sending 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan and, furthermore, would begin 
withdrawing troops 18 months later.1 As military academic and retired Special 
Forces officer Dr. Hy Rothstein points out, more is not always better and the 
addition of troops alone is not sufficient to prevent defeat in Afghanistan.2 
Analysis of successful counterinsurgencies indicates the need for an explicit 
strategy to win the trust and confidence of the local population in respect to the 
state attempting to counter an insurgency. The greatest difficulty in 
counterinsurgency is recognizing the importance of understanding and securing 
the population to increase their support of the incumbent government.3 To ensure 
the success of President Obama’s objective, a change needs to occur in strategy 
that focuses on improving the relationship with the Afghan population, 
strengthening Afghan security forces (particularly their police forces), and 
legitimizing the Afghan government.4  
Since the successful invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the 
Taliban regime, the United States and the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) have failed to prevent the Taliban resurgence. The progression of 
                                            
1 President Barack Obama, "Remarks on U.S. Military and Diplomatic Strategies for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan," Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents (March 27, 2009), 1, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1677819061&Fmt=7&clien
tId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD.  
2 Hy S. Rothstein, "Less is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of 
Collapsing States," Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 275. 
3 See David Galula, Counterisurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 
1964), 143; Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," Military Review, May/June 2005; 
Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, D.C: 
Brassey's, 2002), 199. 
4 Seth Jones, COIN in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study (Santa Barbara, CA: 
RAND, 2008), 176. 
 2
the war has seen the conflict transition from regular to irregular warfare. While 
small numbers of decentralized Special Operation Forces (SOF) operating by, 
with, and through indigenous forces were the initial boots on the ground, over the 
course of the last nine years, centralized conventional forces operating along the 
Afghan National Army (ANA) have become the primary effort in this 
counterinsurgency (COIN). During each subsequent rotation to Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF), conventional forces eventually replaced U.S. Army 
Special Forces (SF) as the battle space owners, and replaced the 
unconventional and then irregular warfare strategy with an increasingly 
conventional and attrition-based one. Recent discussions among both active and 
retired Special Forces commanders propose that the branch refine its mission in 
Afghanistan and its approach to wars by refocusing on its historical mission of 
unconventional warfare. Therefore, to not only restore its strategic utility overall, 
but also help achieve success in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army and its Special 
Forces must adapt itself to remain capable of providing effective economy of 
force, embracing greater risk, and improving its ability to employ irregular forces.5 
B. IMPORTANCE 
After the Taliban resurgence, several military strategists proposed various 
ways ahead for Afghanistan. The authors of this thesis have spent a combined 
total of 38 months in Afghanistan as both conventional and Special Forces 
officers in tactical and operational units. As students of unconventional warfare 
who will likely return to Afghanistan, the authors seized upon the idea that a 
possible solution could be found to correct the U.S. lack of success if the authors 
attempted to reframe the problem. They started with the following statement: “if it 
is accepted that a problem of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan is the inability to 
control the villages, a logical conclusion would be that the formation of village 
                                            
5 John D. Litchfield, "Unconventional Counterinsurgency: Leveraging Traditional Social 
Networks and Irregular Forces in Remote and Ungoverned Areas," Small Wars Journal, 2010, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/litchfieldsamsmonograph.pdf. 
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militias is a necessity.”6 U.S. Army Special Forces Major Jim Gant offered a 
persuasive argument in his essay, “One Tribe at a Time” for greater emphasis on 
utilizing tribes and irregular forces to achieve security in Afghanistan.7 Gant’s 
essay served as a building block that initiated discussion. In a continuation of his 
argument, Gant states that tribes are the key to stability in Afghanistan. 
Therefore, for a strategy to be successful in Afghanistan, it must focus on not 
only gaining a tribe’s allegiance but also utilizing them in the fight against the 
Taliban.8 
From March 24–25, 2009, the authors attended the Tribal Engagement 
Workshop, cosponsored by Small Wars Foundation, the U.S. Joint Forces 
Command Joint Irregular Warfare Center, the U.S. Marine Corps Center for 
Irregular Warfare, the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, 
and Noetic Group in Fredericksburg, Virginia. The objectives of the Tribal 
Engagement Workshop were to evaluate the value and feasibility of a tribal 
engagement approach in Afghanistan, assess what secondary effects the 
adoption of a tribal engagement strategy would have on the political and military 
situation, and identify the operational components of a tribal engagement 
approach in Afghanistan.9 The authors contributed their initial research and 
assessments to the workshop, many of which are highlighted in the Tribal 
Engagement Workshop Summary made available on the Small Wars Journal 
website.10 
                                            
6 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency In 
Afghanistan (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 173. 
7 Jim Gant, "One Tribe At A Time," Steven Pressfield Online, December 2, 2009, 
http://www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/one_tribe_at_a_time_ed2.pdf.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Litchfield, "Unconventional Counterinsurgency: Leveraging Traditional Social Networks and 
Irregular Forces in Remote and Ungoverned Areas."  
10 Small Wars Journal: Tribal Engagement Workshop, March 25, 2010, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/events/tew/. The authors of this thesis and the original Organizational 
Design project were dispersed among three separate working groups at the Tribal Engagement 
Workshop. Among their contributions was the term “Community Engagement” as a more 
appropriate term than those of Tribal or Village due to its applicability to populations structured in 
ways dissimilar to Afghanistan or Iraq.  
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Seth Jones and Arturo Munoz also investigated the viability of establishing 
local defense forces in Afghanistan to complement Afghan National Security 
Forces, and conclude that utilizing local defense forces organized around tribal 
history/organizations are vital to achieve security in Afghanistan. This 
complementary step is necessary along with reintegrating insurgents, countering 
corruption, and improving governance.11  
As Jones and Munoz argued, “successful efforts to protect the population 
need to include better understanding of local communities.”12 Arguably, this lack 
of understanding of local communities contributes to the current challenges in 
successfully conducting COIN in Afghanistan. Therefore, this thesis carefully 
considers this notion, as well as Ben Connable’s admonition that an “effective 
solution to the cultural intelligence gap” is to retrain leaders, units, staffs to not 
only collect, but analyze cultural data and to include this data in all-source 
intelligence products.13 Therefore, this thesis utilizes organizational theory to 
design an organization to accomplish key parts of the military strategy. 
Generically named the Organization for Cultural Engagement (OCE), the concept 
operationalizes an organization designed to engage with the population at the 
lowest level.  
C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
How can organizational theory assist with designing an organization 
created to accomplish a military strategy? Furthermore, would a new military 
organization with a better strategy-structure fit more efficiently and effectively 
engage the population at the lowest level and stabilize areas of conflict, including 
counterinsurgencies?  
                                            
11 Seth G. Jones and Arturo Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010). 
12 Ibid., xi. 
13 Ben Connable, "All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is 
Undermining Sustainable Military Competence," Military Review (March–April 2009): 63. 
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It is the authors’ belief that, in all Areas of Responsibility (AORs), specially 
trained and selected teams focused on long-term socio-cultural relations would 
fill a critical void in the military’s current community engagement efforts and lead 
to a more efficient use of military force and U.S. resources. 
As an organization designed to address engagement with the population 
as its first priority, Community Engagement Concept, can efficiently and 
effectively assist the Department of Defense and enable host nation 
governments to stabilize areas of conflict. 
D.  METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis offers a heuristic based on organizational design theory for 
designing a military organization that accomplishes a military strategy. The 
authors chose Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel’s Strategic Organizational 
Diagnosis and Design—The Dynamics of Fit (3rd ed.) and its supporting 
computer-based interactive analysis program Organizational Consultant 
Version—8 (OrgCon8) as an expert system and the main source for 
organizational design analysis. Burton and Obel’s text includes many of the 
previously recognized organizational theorists, such as Henry Mintzberg, Richard 
Daft, and David Hanna in a comprehensive and step-by-step analysis formatted 
for diagnosing and designing businesses in the civilian sector.  
Although this thesis primarily focuses on the current operations in 
Afghanistan, it is possible to utilize this heuristic to design units that can deploy in 
support of U.S. interests throughout the world without major changes to current 
manning, budget, or force levels.  
E.  THESIS OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis presents an analysis of current and proposed COIN strategy 
and its application to Afghanistan. It recommends, based on that emerging 
strategy, a heuristic for establishing an organization focused on the fulfillment of 
that strategy. This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I is a basic 
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introduction to the research question, hypothesis and its relevance. Chapter II 
provides a background on counterinsurgency and military strategy. Chapter III 
utilizes organization design theory to define the contingency factors of the 
proposed organization, the Organization for Community Engagement (OCE). 
Chapter IV incorporates these contingency factors with the structural 
configuration of the OCE to achieve the best configuration (or ‘fit’) that can 
successfully accomplish the military strategy in Afghanistan. Chapter V 
concludes this thesis and offers recommendations for continued research. 
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II. COIN BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a background on counterinsurgency (COIN), military 
strategy, and the status of the fight in Afghanistan. After comparing and 
contrasting classic and contemporary COIN theorists, this chapter suggests that 
a key component of military strategy is missing in the current International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategy in Afghanistan and is contributing to 
the challenges the ISAF organization faces in the fight against the Taliban. 
Following a description of a number of different organizations conducting COIN in 
Afghanistan, this chapter concludes that none of these organizations can 
successfully engage the entire Afghan population, empower and legitimize the 
local Afghan government, and integrate a multi-gender and multiagency effort 
capable of achieving success in the Afghan environment.  
B. CLASSIC DEFINITIONS APPLIED TO THE CONTEMPORARY 
ENVIRONMENT 
To discuss the Community Engagement Concept effectively, it is first 
necessary to define the following terms and understand that COIN as a subset of 
Irregular Warfare. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines these terms as follows:14 
• Counterinsurgency (COIN): Those military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government 
to defeat an insurgency. 
• Irregular Warfare (IW): A violent struggle among state and non-
state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
population(s).  
According to these definitions, while ISAF is attempting to counter a 
Taliban insurgency, the organization ultimately finds itself conducting irregular 
warfare in which the primary objective is legitimizing the Afghan government 
                                            
14 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, 2009. 
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while simultaneously securing the Afghan population.15 The issue, however, with 
a direct implication that utilizes the classic definitions of the environment and 
enemy, is the realization that Afghanistan is much more complex than is able to 
be defined by JP 1-02’s classic counterinsurgency doctrine.16 The complex 
environment of Afghanistan—and indeed the global struggle against radical 
Islam—demands an effective application of classic COIN theory updated to 
counter the changes in the contemporary, globalized environment. The 
Community Engagement Concept offers ISAF a flexible means for securing and 
stabilizing this complex and dynamic environment.  
C. COIN BACKGROUND AND DOCTRINE 
For over 100 years, authors have grappled with operational techniques to 
fight and win a counterinsurgency. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the focus 
was on Maoist or Marxist revolutionary warfare with the major theorists being 
David Galula, Frank Kitson, Robert Taber, and Bernard Fall. Many experts 
consider David Galula’s, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, the 
flagship volume on COIN and the intellectual bedrock for the U.S. military’s FM 3-
24 Counterinsurgency.  
In a succinct set of principles involved in counterinsurgency warfare, 
Galula’s thesis attests that the ultimate goal of a counterinsurgency force is to 
foster the support of the affected population rather than to control territory. The 
main contribution of the book are the imperatives and principles in the COIN 
environment. Galula provides advice for engaging in the full spectrum of 
counterinsurgency covering a variety of topics including: sequencing of 
operations, patterns of insurgency, mobilizing causes, geography, and leader 
and organizational structure to name a few. 
                                            
15 Mark Grdovic, "Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare," Special Warfare 
22, no. 5 (September/October 2009): 15. 
16 Chris North, "Redefining Insurgency," Military Review (2008): 2. 
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Bernard Fall wrote that revolutionary warfare is simply guerrilla warfare 
plus political action (RW=G+P).17 Fall claims that any small unit can counter 
guerrilla warfare; however, no small unit can counter guerrilla warfare combined 
with a political cause. Fall, having conducted unconventional warfare in France in 
WWII, understood the power of revolutionary warfare. He argues that the 
strength and power of revolutionary warfare is the political, doctrinal, or 
ideological roots behind the action. Having been a scholar of communist 
insurgencies, Bernard Fall would perhaps claim that the radical Islamic ideology 
has replaced communism in his revolutionary warfare paradigm.  
Contemporary COIN theorists apply classic COIN theory to the 
contemporary environment. Instead of a grounding in communist ideology, the 
contemporary environment combines the radical Islamic ideology with new 
technologies to create a markedly complex global environment. Currently, David 
Kilcullen, Seth Jones, and John Nagl are the leading COIN theorists who explore 
these new complexities.  
David Kilcullen provides a helpful perspective on COIN in understanding 
the influence of globalization and its impacts on the Islamist. In The Accidental 
Guerrilla, Kilcullen defines an Islamist as a regional local fighter who organizes 
against outsiders perceived as intruding on the physical and cultural space of 
traditional society. Kilcullen asserts that local wars are primarily guerrilla conflicts 
within societies, often sponsored or inspired by transnational extremists. 
Therefore, the interaction between accidental guerrillas and ideological terrorists 
makes both traditional counterterrorism and classical counterinsurgency models 
inadequate for developing strategies to counter insurgents within the COIN 
landscape. Kilcullen suggests the development of a more pertinent COIN model. 
Kilcullen argues that it is possible to counter insurgents through 
aggressive government programs that stress effective governance, population 
security, and the development of favorable economic conditions. Kilcullen arrives 
                                            
17 Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Naval War 
College Review, April 1965. 
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at several conclusions, considered “best practices” in counterinsurgency 
operations. First, he recommends that a political strategy be developed that 
builds government effectiveness and legitimacy. Second, a need exists to 
develop a strictly adhered to and comprehensive approach to COIN that 
integrates civil and military efforts. Third, continuity of key personnel and policies 
must be attained to provide stability and normalization. Fourth, a strategy of 
population-centric security needs to be enacted. Fifth, a cueing and 
synchronization of development, governance, and security efforts must exist. 
Sixth, a multilateral environment of cooperation needs to be developed, relying 
on a close and genuine partnership that puts the host nation forces in the lead. 
Seventh, a strong emphasis needs to be placed on building effective and 
legitimate local security forces. Lastly, a region-wide approach should be 
developed to disrupt safe-havens, control borders and frontier regions, and 
undermine terrorist infrastructure in neighboring countries. 
In Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Seth Jones identifies the capabilities 
that the U.S. military should consider developing to improve its ability to wage 
effective counterinsurgency operations. Beginning with an analysis of COIN 
theory using the classic standard-bearers, such as Galula and Kitson, Jones 
operationalizes the population-centric approach in respect to Afghanistan. Jones’ 
COIN model shows the indigenous government, insurgent groups, and external 
actors all in direct competition for the center of gravity: the population. 
Jones claims that the capacities of the indigenous security forces, local 
governance, and external support for insurgents are the hallmarks of success or 
failure of counterinsurgency efforts. He asserts that the United States and ISAF 
should focus their resources to help improve the capacity of the indigenous 
government (and its security forces) to wage counterinsurgency warfare, which 
thereby, would improve their competency and legitimacy. Jones highlights many 
preferred operational and tactical techniques for Afghanistan. He asserts that the 
Afghan National Police should be the primary focus of the coalition’s training 
efforts. He identifies the undermining issues preventing good governance in 
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Afghanistan as its ineffective justice system, government corruption, unchecked 
power of warlords and tribal militias, and the drug trade. Jones recommends that 
command and control of the counter-insurgent forces be decentralized down to 
the smallest unit possible. Finally, he claims that the best way to win over the 
population and isolate the insurgents is to live with the population, similar to the 
CAPs or CORDs programs of the Vietnam War.  
The U.S. Army published FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency in an attempt to 
capture the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan in a common language using 
classical counterinsurgency terms. The manual adjusts the thinking and practices 
of U.S. conventionally-oriented, attrition-based ground forces by clearly 
describing COIN as a political, cultural, and sociological struggle that needs to be 
focused on the population. The FM acknowledges that COIN is complex and 
demands “draw[ing] heavily on a broad range of the joint force’s capabilities and 
require[ing] a . . . mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.”18  
Bernard Fall famously stated, “if it works, it is obsolete.”19 His statement 
infers that the military bureaucratic machine is comfortable with routine 
procedures and tasks that do not deviate from a standard mold. Fall argues that 
if an organization is comfortable, then it probably is not changing and adapting to 
the changing enemy. Supporting this idea is a recurrent theory in the FM: “the 
side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly- the better learning organization- 
usually wins.”20 This identifies an imperative of success for U.S. forces in this 
low-intensity and dynamic fight. Leaders and soldiers must prepare prior to a 
deployment by studying insurgency and counterinsurgency. They must continue 
to learn downrange while they attempt to defeat these irregular enemies. FM 3-
24 states, “a learning organization that can accurately identify the weaknesses of  
 
                                            
18 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C., 
2005), p. 2–5. 
19 Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Naval War 
College Review (April 1965). 
20 FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, p. ix.  
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the external environment of war and reconfigure its own capability to exploit 
those weaknesses will defeat an insurgency; a bureaucratic hierarchy that is 
inward focused on administration and operations will not.”21  
Like David Galula and Seth Jones, FM 3-24 concludes that the focus of 
counterinsurgency is the people. The manual asserts that "contact with the 
people is critical to the local COIN effort’s success" and that “people who do not 
believe they are secure from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals will 
not risk overtly supporting COIN efforts.”22 COIN forces must provide for the 
people, protect the people, and convince the people that their incumbent 
government is legitimate. The FM argues that efforts to collect information about 
the insurgency and the population are equally important. The more rapidly COIN 
forces can enable legitimacy, the sooner they can end the population’s active 
and passive support to the insurgency. Since this struggle is not just a military 
one, FM 3-24 argues that effective COIN operations require a balanced 
application and unity of effort between military and civil efforts and organizations. 
The common theme recurring in Galula, Kilcullen, Jones, and FM 3-24 is 
one of a population-centric approach focused on security and legitimacy 
executed at the local level. While FM 3-24 is grounded in classic COIN theory, 
the manual suggests merging traditional approaches with “the realities of a new 
world shaped by globalization and the spread of extremist ideologies . . . [in what 
can be described as] neo-classical counterinsurgency.”23 Therefore, if the United 
States is going to employ a COIN approach capable of achieving stability and 
security in Afghanistan or other unstable regions, a paradigm shift away from 
conventional priorities and the emphasis on massive weapons systems toward 
the enhancement of capabilities for stability operations must occur within the U.S. 
military and ISAF.  
                                            
21 Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," Parameters XIII, no. 4 (1983); FM 
3-24 Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006. 
22 FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 5–21. 
23 Frank G. Hoffman, "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?," Parameters (Summer 2007): 73. 
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D. THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY STRATEGY 
The topic of military strategy has and continues to be loosely defined by 
politicians and military leaders.24 However, strategy continues to be “the 
essential ingredient for making war either politically effective or morally tenable . . 
. . Without strategy, there is no rationale for how force will achieve purposes 
worth the price in blood and treasure.”25 With the war in Afghanistan now 
America’s longest war, many “have seriously questioned whether the U.S. has a 
coherent over strategy for the war and, if so, what it is.”26 Strategy is defined as 
“a set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized 
and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational 
objectives.”27 As an easier way to discuss military strategy, the U.S. Army War 
College utilizes General Maxwell Taylor’s characterization of “strategy as 
consisting of objectives [ends], ways and means.”28 Using this concept, “strategy 
equals ends plus ways plus means.”29 For a military strategy to be able to 
achieve success, the U.S. armed forces must utilize a sequenced 
approach to achieve a balance between the ways, means, and ends.30 
While the initial military strategy of the United States was to defeat the 
Taliban to prevent them from providing safe haven to Al Qaeda, this strategy has 
slowly morphed into defeating the Taliban insurgency to stabilize Afghanistan. 
U.S. forces decisively defeated the Taliban government in 2001 in the first few 
months of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by using a well-balanced military 
strategy in ways, ends, and means. The Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
                                            
24 Arthur F. Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," Military Review (January/February 1997). 
25 Richard Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?," International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 5–50. 
26 David J. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," The Journal of Strategic Studies 28, 
no. 4 (August 2005): 608. 
27 Joint Publication (JP) 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2009): 524. 
28 Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," 183. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?”  
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finds themselves, nine years later, battling a resurgent Taliban that is 
destabilizing Afghanistan with a successful insurgency. An analysis of the U.S. 
strategy reveals that, other than an increase in deployed forces, the United 
States has done very little to adapt to the evolving conflict in terms of the means 
of achieving a successful strategy.31 Unfortunately, as military strategist Dr. John 
Arquilla points out, militaries are reluctant to change:  
America's armed forces have failed, as militaries so often do, to 
adapt sufficiently to changed conditions, finding out the hard way 
that their enemies often remain a step ahead. The U.S. military 
floundered for years in Iraq, then proved itself unable to grasp the 
point, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that old-school surges of 
ground troops do not offer enduring solutions to new-style conflicts 
with networked adversaries.32  
Dr. Arquilla concludes that reliance on the strategies of “shock and awe" 
and the Powell doctrine of "overwhelming force" have handicapped the United 
States in its fight while killing civilians and enraging their survivors.33 Often times, 
this outrage can lead to the creation of additional enemies.34  
The United States needs to attack the Taliban’s indirect strategy—which is 
winning the support of the population—to defeat the Taliban. Unfortunately, the 
United States faces challenges in Afghanistan because its strategy is 
diametrically opposed to the insurgents’ strategy. Military academic Dr. Ivan 
Arreguín-Toft argues that a “weak actor’s strategy can make a strong actor’s 
power irrelevant” when the weak actor fights an indirect strategy of guerrilla 
warfare against the direct attack strategy of a strong actor.35 By definition, weak 
actors cannot directly oppose strong actors. Therefore, a weak actor is best 
served by using an indirect strategy. The “opposite-approach interaction” allows 
                                            
31 John Arquilla, " The New Rules of War," Foreign Policy (March/April 2010). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
34 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 346. 
35 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," 
International Security 26, no. 1 (July 2001): 95. 
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the weak actor to deflect and dodge the technological and tactical power of the 
strong actor.36 In time, the opposite-approach interaction between strong and 
weak actors favors the weak actors. They will eventually win or tie in the conflict. 
The strong actors are, of course, the United States and ISAF, while the weak 
actors are the various Afghan insurgent groups, principally the Taliban, and Al-
Qaeda. Sun Tzu theorized that a vital offensive strategy is to attack your enemy’s 
strategy.37  
By focusing on current U.S. direct, enemy-centric ways of destroying the 
Taliban’s capacity to fight as opposed to an indirect, population-centric approach 
to stabilize Afghanistan, the United States and ISAF are facing a possible defeat 
as the war continues to drag on and the American public’s support of the conflict 
wanes.38 The United States and ISAF need to adapt their “means” in the military 
strategy equation to employ an indirect strategy that focuses on the population as 
the center of gravity. 
Military theoretician Dr. Edward Luttwak offers evidence of the need for an 
organized and focused force focused on low-intensity conflicts, such as irregular 
warfare. Arguing that armed forces operate on a strategy spectrum with attrition 
on one end and relational-maneuver on the other, Luttwak explains that the 
United States designs its conventional forces to be organizationally and 
operationally focused for attrition warfare. Conventional forces are suitable and 
well equipped to fight the high intensity type of warfare where attrition usually 
guarantees victory. However, the United States currently finds itself in low-
intensity warfare where attrition will not guarantee victory. Luttwak argues that 
focusing on the relational-maneuver end of the strategy spectrum is better suited 
for the low-intensity warfare.  
                                            
36 Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," 105.  
37 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 
77. 
38 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big, xv. 
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Low-intensity warfare is not merely a “lesser-included case of ‘real’ war,” 
but is instead complex, ill defined, and ambiguous.39 Victory in this type of 
warfare requires armed forces to use a relational-maneuver strategy that 
identifies the weaknesses of the external environment of war and reconfigures its 
“own capability to exploit those weaknesses.”40 However, the United States 
continues to fight attrition warfare based on a focus on “internal administration 
and operations, being less responsive to the external environment comprising the 
enemy [and] the terrain.”41 The doctrine (ways), as well as the internal 
administration and bureaucratic mechanisms (means) of the U.S. armed forces, 
are inherently inefficient, inflexible, and unresponsive to the rapidly changing and 
complex environment.42  
The attrition/direct approach strategy utilized by the United States worked 
well in the beginning of the war. However, as the intensity of the conflict 
decreased and Taliban targets became less defined, the United States 
discovered that its reliance on firepower did not achieve the same level of 
success against the more widely dispersed insurgents. As fighting among the 
population in Afghanistan proves, the “pursuit of attrition efficiencies…processed 
to generate firepower, the more the results are likely to be counterproductive by 
antagonizing the local population.”43 Therefore, to attack the enemy’s strategy 
and best match the approach, it is necessary to transform the armed forces’ 
means of the Afghan strategy and develop an organization that can effectively 
utilize a relational-maneuver and indirect approach. An organization that 
maximizes internal efficiencies, sets optimal organizational structure, and can  
 
 
                                            
39 Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," Parameters XIII, no. 4 (1983): 335. 
40 Ibid., 336. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1994). 
43 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change , 337. 
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continually reconfigure and adapt based on the external environment. A new 
organization with a relational-maneuver and indirect strategy should be 
decentralized and focused on stabilization at the local level.44 
The current U.S. and ISAF strategy in Afghanistan attempts to create a 
legitimate, democratic, strong central government. However, “Afghanistan has a 
long history of decentralized governance.”45 In the absence of a strong, central 
government, the local village councils (shuras) of elders hold the true power and 
have developed informal legal systems based on Islamic and customary laws. 
Due to the lack of electricity and television and the distance from Kabul, politics 
in the villages and valleys of Afghanistan is truly local. Therefore, some argue 
that, “stabilization needs to increasingly come from the bottom up, not the top 
down.”46 
In operationalizing counterinsurgency, both David Galula and Colonel Eric 
Wendt argue that to defeat the insurgency, U.S. forces need to have both static 
and mobile forces.47 Wendt argues that these static, “constabulary” forces are 
those trained in unconventional warfare who can embed “in a local population for 
long periods of time and develop local human intelligence.”48 The static forces 
that live and operate inside targeted areas of active insurgent activity need to be 
the main effort in the counterinsurgency efforts. By living among the population 
and achieving consistent access, the static force gains an unparalleled 
knowledge of local human intelligence, including insurgent leaders and the flow 
of insurgent support.49 The static force knows much of what is occurring in that 
                                            
44 Jones, COIN in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study, 176. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Seth G. Jones, Stabilization from the Bottom Up (paper presented before the Commission 
on Wartime Contracting, Washington, D.C. , February 22, 2010, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT340/. 
47 David Galula, Counterisurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), 
143; Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," Special Warfare 18, no. 2 
(September 2005): 7. 
48 Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," 3. 
49 Ibid. 
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village or district and can apply the appropriate mix of rewards and punishments 
to achieve stability. On the other hand, the maneuver forces, or mobile forces, 
would comprise conventional units “trained, organized, and equipped to attack 
insurgent output.”50 The maneuver force is the supporting effort in 
counterinsurgency and focuses its effort on securing lines of communication and 
conducting movement to contact when it encounters insurgent forces.51  
E. CURRENT ISAF COIN ORGANIZATIONS AND EFFORTS 
Although a variety of recently developed organizations in Afghanistan 
attempt to use a decentralized, population-centric approach that can synchronize 
both civic and military rewards and punishments, these organizations have not 
adequately secured the center or gravity of Afghanistan, built capacity in their 
partner local defense forces/ANSF, or help legitimize the GIRoA. The entities and 
initiatives currently operating with an attempt at an indirect approach are:  
• The Community Defense Initiative (CDI): a small-scale initiative 
supported by the Combined Forces Special Operations Command 
Cell —Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) and executed by the Combined 
Joint Special Operations Task Force —Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).52 
The CDI focuses on local security by organizing and training the 
Civil Defense Forces (CDF).  
• The Civil Defense Forces (CDF): a program that has been 
established by, and whose partner is, the (CJSOTF-A) Special 
Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas (ODAs), select military-
aged males from the local population and organize, train, and equip 
these personnel into a local security force that provides support and 
security to the local village or district in a neighbor watch-style 
fashion. 
                                            
50 Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," 3. 
51 Ibid., 8. 
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• Military Training Teams (MiTT): conventional or general-purpose 
armed forces selected and trained to train and support Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF).53 
• Human Terrain Team (HTT): A sub-element under the Human 
Terrain System (HTS). The program is run by the U.S. Army 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and serves the joint 
community. The focus of the HTS program is to improve the 
military’s ability to understand the highly complex local socio-
cultural environment in the areas where they are deployed. In the 
long term, HTS endeavors to assist the U.S. government in 
understanding foreign countries and regions prior to an 
engagement within that region.54 
• Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT): Military organizations 
conceived in Afghanistan to extend the reach and enhance the 
legitimacy of the central government. PRTs have a broad mandate 
covering the following areas: engaging key government, military, 
tribal, village, and religious leaders in the provinces, while 
monitoring and reporting on important political, military and 
reconstruction developments; working with Afghan authorities to 
provide security; assisting in the deployment and mentoring of 
Afghan national army and police units assigned to the provinces; in 
partnership with the Afghan Government, the U.N., other donors 
and NGOs, PRTs also provide needed development and 
humanitarian assistance.55 
• District Support Team (DST): sub-elements of the PRT that consist 
of local teams with on-site development personnel: “District 
Development Teams” that project PRT presence down to the 
district level.56  
• Female Engagement Team (FET): units comprised of female 
Marines with various operational specialties who conduct liaison 
work with Afghan women in remote villages. Their assignments  
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range from searching women at checkpoints, distributing aid, and 
running medical clinics, to their core mission of engaging rural 
Pashtun women, often in their homes.57 
The current efforts of the myriad of organizations are not synchronized 
and have not they been successful in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan 
population. These organizations either focus on reconstruction efforts, enabling 
Afghan security forces, or gaining an understanding of the human terrain. While 
these efforts are important, they are inherently inefficient because the 
organizations are separately and singularly focused on their own specialty. The 
authors argue that these current efforts have a flawed strategic and operational 
approach; they do not adequately prioritize the population.  
The military strategist, classic and contemporary COIN theorists, as well 
as FM 3-24, provide the adequate ways of succeeding in Afghanistan. What 
continues to be lacking in the military strategy equation is the means. Therefore, 
the U.S. military would benefit from applying the ways of its COIN doctrine to an 
organization designed to be the means to accomplish the ends in Afghanistan. 
As a way of addressing President Obama’s intent in Afghanistan, an organization 
should be designed to be the means of the military strategy that can establish 
and maintain continual engagement with the Afghan population; thereby, 
assisting in U.S. eventual withdrawal of conventional forces. The actions of this 
newly organized team would also support General Petraeus’ directive to “engage 
with the population.”58 Although there has been much discussion about how to 
best “operationalize” this directive, adequate discussion has not occurred, up to 
this point, about how to organize, resource, and employ a force that would meet 
these needs. 
                                            
57 Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, "Woman to Woman: A New Strategy in Afghanistan: NPR," 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112606206. 
58 David H. Patraeus, “COMISAF ‘s COIN Guidance”, http://www.isaf.nato.int/the-afghan-
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III. ORGANIZATION DESIGN THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter combines the analysis of the counterinsurgency theory and 
military strategy in the previous chapter with organizational theory to design an 
organization that has an appropriate configuration (or ‘fit’) to accomplish the 
military strategy in Afghanistan. The authors’ process for designing this new 
organization is to first analyze the military strategy (Chapter II), identify and 
measure the organizational strategic fit (Chapter III), and then explore the design 
properties (Chapter IV). Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, the final 
step in the organizational design is to develop the actual architecture of the 
organization.  
In addition to re-examining doctrine and tactics to remain a step ahead of 
the enemy a need also exists to adapt, add, or change organizations to be 
efficient and effective in today’s complex and demanding conflicts. Overall, the 
purpose of the Community Engagement Concept is to accomplish the military 
strategy in Afghanistan with a smaller footprint of troops. The Organization for 
Community Engagement (OCE) prioritizes the engagement of the local 
population at the lowest level possible—usually the village or tribal level. This 
chapter applies the model proposed by Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel in 
Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit. The 
authors use the model to measure and categorize the Strategic Fit domains, 
which then suggest properties of the structural design of the OCE.59 
                                            
59 Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The 
Dynamics of Fit, 3rd ed. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).  
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B. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN BACKGROUND 
Organizational design is the method by which organizations are structured 
to best accomplish their mission and strategy.60 In their book, Burton and Obel 
propose a model for prescribing how an organization can be most effective, 
efficient, and viable.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Burton and Obel’s Contingency Fit Model61 
The model consists of matching the diagnosis and strategic fits—
leadership and management style, organizational climate, capabilities, 
environment, technology, and organizational strategy—with the design fits—
complexity, formalization, centralization, incentives, and coordination and control 
—to determine the best strategy and structure fit.62 This chapter analyzes the  
 
 
                                            
60 It is assumed that the reader has a base of knowledge in organizational design theory. If 
the reader does not, then it is recommended that he review works from Richard L. Daft, David P. 
Hannah, Henry Mintzberg, and Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel. 
61 Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit, 20. 
62 Ibid. 
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diagnosis and strategic fit domains for the OCE and then uses the expert system 
provided by Burton and Obel to analyze and recommend a structural 
configuration.  
The Organizational Consultant program developed by Burton and Obel is 
an expert system that aids in the diagnosis and design of organizations,63 which 
is an inherently qualitative program that gathers data entered by the user via a 
series of simple diagnostic questions. These questions are modeled around the 
organization’s goals, environment and strategy, structure, process and people, 
size and age, and coordination and control. It then analyzes the data through a 
series of if-then statements to determine the strategic fit of an organization.64 The 
Organizational Consultant program (OrgCon 8) processes the answers to the 
questions and returns an analysis of the organization.  
Short of designing the architecture of the organization, the authors made 
some basic assumptions about the OCE. First, we assumed that the organization 
is hierarchically structured with at least three levels. The bottom layer focuses on 
the local community, which are the teams that live with the population and are 
the operating core of the OCE. This bottom layer enables the local leadership to 
organize, train, and equip a local security force. Additionally, this layer will 
interact with the community elements, develop rapport, and leverage U.S. and 
coalition programs for development, stability, and security. The middle layer 
serves a buffering role to resource, synchronize, and coordinate the operations of 
the lower level with the strategy of the upper level. The middle layer provides 
command and control, targeting and analysis, psychological operations, 
information operations, operational coordination and deconfliction, administrative 
support, and medical support to civil-military operations. The upper level is the 
strategic apex of the organization and serves to coordinate and deconflict with all 
outside departments, agencies, or organizations.  
                                            
63 This thesis utilizes the OrgCon 8 version included in Burton and Obel’s 3rd edition. 
64 See Appendix B for the complete OrgCon questionnaire. 
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C. LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
The concept of a learning organization better addresses the managerial 
issues that arise in the chaotic and competitive environment of the 21st century. 
Organizational behavior and design theorist Richard L. Daft synthesized the 
definition of a learning organization as “one in which everyone is engaged in 
identifying and solving problems, enabling the organization to continuously 
experiment, change, improve, and thus increase its capacity to grow, learn, and 
achieve its purposes.”65 A learning organization can be broken down into six 
critical components: leadership, structure, empowerment, communications and 
information sharing, participative strategy, and adaptive culture.  
In a learning organization, the most important of these factors is 
leadership. Daft states, “the only means through which a company can change 
into a learning organization [is through its leadership].”66 Whereas most large 
organizations view leaders as managers who have “control over” the people and 
processes within the organization, a learning organization requires a leader who 
takes a more “control with” approach, assisting the other members of the 
organization by helping to create a “shared vision” of the organizations 
overarching goals.67 Once the members of an organization understand the 
desired long-term outcomes, members are free and encouraged to identify and 
solve problems to achieve that vision without direct or constant supervision from 
above. 
As the U.S. Army’s COIN manual FM 3-24 states, “[in a COIN 
environment] the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly, the better 
learning organization usually wins.”68 This thesis uses the concept of a learning 
organization in the organizational design of the OCE. 
                                            
65 Richard L. Daft and Dorothy Marcic, Understanding Management, 3rd ed. (Mason, OH: 
South-Western Thomas Learning, 2001), 17. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 18. 
68 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, ix. 
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D. DIAGNOSIS AND STRATEGIC FIT DOMAINS 
This section defines and explains Burton and Obel’s diagnosis and 
strategic fit domains of the community engagement concept. Since it is 
developed against the backdrop of Afghanistan, the diagnosis and strategic fit 
domains are applied to the organization for community engagement operating in 
this environment. Where possible, a two-stage process explains the domain. The 
domain is described, applied to the OCE, and then measured generally on a 
scale of low, medium, or high. The resulting measure of the domain leads to a 
suggested organizational structural property from which helps design the OCE.  
E. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT STYLE DOMAIN 
Leadership and management style is an important domain of 
organizational design and critical to a learning organization. Whether leadership 
style determines the organizational design or vice versa, it is important that the 
leadership style fit with the strategy of the OCE. As Burton and Obel claim, “for 
an organization to function well, there should be a fit between what the 
organization wants to do; how it wants to do it; and the people who have to do 
it.”69  
Many dimensions of leadership and management styles exist. Each leader 
possesses strengths and weaknesses that, in turn, affect the efficiency and 
effectiveness of an organization. As a result of the organization’s complexity, 
formalization, and centralization, there are leadership styles that best fit the 
organization. This section defines leadership dimensions and identifies the level 
of those dimensions that are ideal for the OCE. Similar to measuring and 
categorizing the organizational climate, measuring the leadership dimensions will 
help suggest a leadership style that best fits the OCE. The best fit of the 
leadership style will therefore identify the structural properties necessary to 
implement the community engagement concept as the organization for 
community engagement and establish a viable organizational design. The 
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leadership and management style is primarily a measure of psychological 
dimensions. It includes delegation preferences, decision-making preferences, 
planning preferences, risk preferences, and motivation and control preferences.  
1. Preference for Delegation 
The OCE’s focus on the lowest level of the population. To engage with the 
lowest level, the leadership preference would be one focused on delegation and 
decentralization rather than control and centralization. The effective OCE leader 
would most likely delegate authority, tasks, and mission to the lowest level of the 
organization possible because it would be more efficient and supportive of the 
organizational strategy. 
2. Level of Detail in Decision Making 
The OCE leadership will show a preference for gaining a high level of 
information prior to making decisions due to the complexity of the environment 
and the repercussions of the decisions among the local population. However, 
when a requirement exists to make time-sensitive decisions, the OCE leadership 
will show a preference for maintaining flexibility in decision making. 
3. Reactive or Proactive Decision Making 
Through assimilation of the myriad of intelligence and local information 
sources, the OCE leadership will desire a focus on anticipating changes in the 
environment. When those changes happen to outpace anticipation, the OCE 
needs to maintain sufficient flexibility and agility to react to those changes.  
4. Decision-Making Time Horizon 
Leaders at the upper levels of the OCE will tend to make decisions more 
focused on the long term, whereas the leaders at the lower level of the OCE will 




As a whole, the organization should be focused on long-term organizational 
strategy, and thus, have a long-term time horizon with a similar focus on decision 
making. 
5. Risk Preference 
Risk preference is the level of risk that a leader is willing to assume. The 
leader analyzes the risks to the mission, to the OCE members, and to the local 
citizens. Due to the need to develop an ability to adapt to a divergent, rapidly 
changing, and hostile environment, the OCE leadership will tend to prefer 
innovation and be subject to accepting a high degree of risk.  
6. Motivation 
Since the leadership within the OCE will be focused on a cooperative 
approach with fellow members, they will tend to motivate instead of explicitly 
controlling the individuals in the organization. Therefore, the OCE leadership will 
be adept at motivating and encouraging the members. 
7. Categorizing the Leadership Domain 
The measures of the leadership domain operationalize the best 
corresponding leadership style. Burton and Obel use four possible leadership 
styles: leader, producer, entrepreneur, and manager.70 Resulting from the 
analysis of the dimensions above, the best fit of leadership style for the OCE is 
the leader. A leader is an “individual with a high preference for delegation, a long-
term horizon, aggregate information, general decision-making, a proactive 
approach, risk taking, and motivation by inspiration.”71 
 
 
                                            




Substantial interaction occurs between a leadership style and the 
configuration of an organization and the aspects of each affect the other. 
Although the leader style of leadership fits within any organization, the different 
attributes of the leader style are more or less emphasized to maintain the fit. 
A medium to large organization like a mature OCE with a leader style will 
tend to maintain its flexibility on decision making. The OCE leader will make 
decisions on one matter while allowing or delegating decisions on other matters. 
The organizational structure will generally have low formalization, medium 
complexity, and a results-based incentive structure. The leader style of 
leadership proposes that the OCE conducts coordination and control through 
general oversight and review, loose coordination, meetings, and liaisons 
combined with rich information processing. 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY DOMAIN 
The OCE is designed for the successful accomplishment of this military 
strategy as outlined in Chapter II through the nesting of its organizational 
strategy. Organizational strategy is the “plan for interacting with the competitive 
environment to achieve the organizational goals.”72 The commander of ISAF, 
General Petraeus, provided the organizational goals, or the “desired state of 
affairs” of the Community Engagement Concept in his recently published COIN 
Guidance.73 These goals are to secure and serve the population, enable Afghans 
to build legitimate governance, pursue the enemy relentlessly, foster lasting 
solutions, promote local integration, empower subordinates, and exercise 
initiative.74  
The mission, or overall goal, for the Organization for Community 
Engagement is to assist the local Afghan government and security forces by 
                                            
72 Richard L. Daft, Organizational Theory and Design, 10th ed. (Mason, OH: South-Western 
Cengage Learning, 2010); Daft and Marcic, Understanding Management, 65. 
73 Ibid., 58. 
74 Petraeus, "COMISAF’s COIN Guidance." 
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building their capacity to promote security and stability. The OCE will have 
effective interagency and inter-organizational collaboration to build the capacity 
of the Afghan security forces to defeat Anti-Afghan Shadow Government Forces 
(AAF), assist with the establishment of a secure environment, and aid the 
indigenous security and government forces with supporting the legitimacy of the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).  
What is effective for one particular OCE element in the Pashtun tribal 
areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan may not be successful for an OCE 
element operating among the non-tribal Tajiks or Uzbeks of northern 
Afghanistan. Although the OCE is inherently a defensive organization that builds 
the capacity on the local community element to provide their own security, it will 
have the capability to influence coalition military operations against enemy 
targets. 
Following the two-stage process, Burton and Obel use eight dimensions to 
explain and then categorize the organizational strategy domain.  
1 Product Innovation 
The OCE will have a high product innovation level because of the demand 
to develop solutions (i.e., products) that solve the unique problems encountered 
at the tribal or village level.  
2. Process Innovation 
The OCE will have a medium to high level of process innovation. The 
organization will have medium process innovation for routine tasks, such as 
liaisons or coordination with outside military organizations. However, the various 
other unique tasks that demand flexibility and responsiveness will require a high 
level of process innovation.  
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3. Product and Market Breadth 
The OCE will have a few to a moderate amount of products. At the lowest 
level, the OCE will engage with the community and enable them to create a local 
defense force. Also, the OCE will leverage the many different stability assistance 
programs. Since the OCE will target the many subcultures in Afghanistan, the 
Community Engagement Concept will have a wide market breadth (Pashtun, 
Tajik, Uzbek, etc.).  
4. Concern for Quality 
The OCE will have a medium to high concern for quality. It is important to 
note that concern for quality is relative to the customer, environment, and 
timeline associated with receiving it. The OCE will be concerned to deliver a 
product that is high quality in the eyes of the customer. However, because the 
concern for quality is dependent on the timeliness of actually receiving a product, 
the concern for quality will tend to be medium to provide the product in a more 
timely fashion. When the timeline of receiving the product is unaffected by the 
quality, the OCE will be concerned for the highest quality.  
5. Price Level 
Price level is also relative to the competing organizations. Within the CEC, 
the price level is low because the organization will cost significantly less than 
other military organizations.  
6. Control Level 
The OCE will have a low level of control at the lower organizational level 
and a higher level of control at the upper organizational level.  
7. Technology 
The OCE will have a non-routine technology to have a multiplicative effect 
on the complex and uncertain environment.  
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8. Barrier to Entry 
Due to the difficulty for the OCE to enter a targeted population, a very high 
barrier to entry into the environment exists. Once the appropriate analysis is 
complete, the OCE will be better prepared to enter into that market and begin to 
conduct its mission. Also, simply due to the bureaucracy of the U.S. military, a 
high barrier to entry exists because the level of oversight and authority necessary 
to create a new organization is formidable. 
9. Categorizing Organizational Strategy 
Burton and Obel identify five types of organizational strategy that 
incorporate these measures to determine the best structural configuration. These 
categories of strategy are prospector, analyzer with innovation, analyzer without 
innovation, defender, and reactor.75 Reviewing the above measures, the 
Organization for Community Engagement strategy is a mix of the prospector 
strategy and the defender strategy.76 Like the prospector strategy, the OCE has 
a similar preference for high product innovation, a high barrier to entry, non-
routine technology, concern of high quality, and a low preferred level of control. 
However, similar to the defender strategy, the OCE has a high process 
innovation, few products, and low relative cost when compared to the 
conventional military, or existing, equivalent. Since the OCE does not follow all 
the measurements of the first four strategies, the strategy is therefore hybrid, or 
reactor. An organization has a reactor strategy when some strategy 
measurements lead to a prospector strategy and the remaining measurements 
lead to the defender strategy.77  
                                            
75 Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit, 
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76 Burton and Obel write on page 285 that Nicholson Rees and Bookrs-Rooney (1990) write 
that a defender strategy is to produce efficiently a limited set of products directed at a narrow 
segment of the total potential market. A prospector strategy is to find and exploit new products 
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77 Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit, 
307. 
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10. Interplay between Strategy and Structure 
It is necessary to appreciate the interplay between an organization’s 
strategy and structure. No organization has a static strategy and structure 
relationship. That is, as the strategy continues to develop, the structure also 
changes. Likewise, for the structure, as the organizational structure changes, the 
strategy also adapts. The interplay between strategy and structure is important to 
understand because as the relationship changes, so do the strategy measures, 
and therefore, the strategic category changes to maintain the best fit for the 
organization. 
G. ENVIRONMENTAL DOMAIN 
Four dimensions measure the OCE’s environment: equivocality, 
uncertainty, complexity, and hostility. 
1. Equivocality 
Equivocality is the organization’s ignorance, confusion, or lack of 
understanding in the environment. This factor can be related to the military’s use 
of regulations and standard operating procedures. The elements of the OCE will 
operate in an environment that has a high degree of equivocality because of the 
cultural bias that the OCE will inherently bring to their mission. No matter how 
much study is done prior to execution, the OCE’s existence in the environment is 
an artificiality that is difficult for a non-native to overcome.  
2. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is an organization’s inability to predict outcomes due to a lack 
of knowledge of environmental variables and relationships. Uncertainty is in most 
cases related to issues that the organization has experienced previously. The 
OCE will function in an environment with a moderate level of uncertainty 
because, as individual and organizational experience grows, situations can 
become somewhat predictable; the organization’s actions will have a predictable 
and causal relationship to the reaction among the population it is addressing. 
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3. Complexity 
Complexity is the number of variables in the environment and their 
interdependency. Managing interdependent variables is more complex than 
managing independent variables. Therefore, an interdependent environment is 
more complex than one in which variables vary independently. The environment 
will have a high level of complexity. One of the contributing factors to the 
complexity of the environment in Afghanistan is the many interdependent 
stakeholders and their divergent agendas. An analysis of the stakeholders in 
Afghanistan shows that a myriad of interested parties exist that wield significant 
influence. As an example, the population of Afghanistan consists of five different 
ethnic groups. Most local environments are heterogeneous depending on the 
composition and ratios of ethnic groups that comprise geographic areas. 
Additional stakeholders consist of the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA), U.S. Government, U.S. population, border nations, and 
enemy forces. 
4. Hostility 
Hostility is the measure of how benign or malevolent the environment is. 
Hostility can vary from a supporting environment to one that is predatory and out 
to destroy the organization.78 The environment will have a high level of hostility 
due to the Anti-Afghan or Taliban forces who maintain significant influence over 
the local population. In addition to hostility from actors with competing interests in 
the Afghan environment, the military and political organizations from which the 
OCE members will originate will also be considered hostile, as they are 
competitors for the same national resources. 
H. ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE DOMAIN 
Like all the strategic factors, it is necessary to define the organizational 
climate of the Organization for Community Engagement to determine the 
                                            
78 Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit. 
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necessary structural design. With an understanding of the organizational climate, 
the design elements become apparent and prioritized. Organizational climate is a 
“prevailing condition or atmosphere in an organization” that is a measure of the 
organization rather than the individuals.79 However, to arrive at a measure of the 
climate, it is necessary to “capture how individuals feel about the organization.”80 
Therefore, although climate is a quality of the organization, it must be explained 
by analyzing inputs from the individuals of the organization.  
Burton and Obel use seven characteristics to measure an organization’s 
climate: trust, conflict, morale, rewards equitability, change resistance, leader 
credibility, and scapegoating. These measures are then applied to four 
categories of climate: group climate, developmental climate, rational goal climate, 
and internal process climate.81 The results of the various measures will predict 
the climate of that organization.82 Those measures are as follow. 
1. Trust 
At the bottom level, the Organization for Community Engagement, 
individuals should be bonded and have a high degree of trust among the other 
team members because they will live with the Afghan population, which is a 
relatively hostile and austere environment. It will be required for the team to be 
highly dependent upon each other for issues safety and security. They will also 
have to build trusting relationships within the environment and among the 
associated stakeholders. In the middle and top levels of the organization, there 
will be a high to medium level of trust. Although they will be living in more secure  
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161. 
80 Ibid., 130. 
81 Ibid., 146. 
82 The results of these measures, when applied to the Organization for Community 
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and safe locations on a nearby base, the individuals will have a high to medium 
level of trust because they are working together for a common goal in a new 
organization. 
2. Conflict 
The OCE will have a medium to low level of conflict because the multiple 
levels of the organization and the individuals are all unified on the organizational 
goals and beliefs. However, it is unavoidable that there will be friction and 
disagreement, and therefore, the sporadic disunity will contribute to a sporadic 
amount of medium conflict. 
3. Morale 
The OCE will have a medium to high level of individual morale because 
the individuals are confident and enthusiastic about the organization and mission. 
The morale will be higher at the lower level because the individuals can see the 
immediate impact of their efforts. 
4. Rewards Equitability 
Rewards are focused on how well the individuals and units meet the goals 
of the organization. They are awarded either based on consummation of service 
or due to a specific action. Consequently, rewards will be moderately equitable 
because individuals will be rewarded based off individual performance and the 
organizational results. Chapter IV explains in greater depth the incentive 
structure of the OCE. 
5. Resistance to Change 
The OCE will have varying degrees of resistance to change. The lowest 
level that interacts with the local community will have a low resistance to change 
because of the local population, enemy forces, and the dynamics of the 
environment. The highest level will have a medium resistance to change because 
of the strain it places on the relationships with the various outside agencies. 
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6. Leader Credibility 
Leader credibility is high because the individuals in the OCE will accept 
the legitimacy of the leader. 
7. Scapegoating 
The level of scapegoating is low because the individual duty descriptions 
will delineate who has responsibility for what actions and individuals believe that 
individuals will accept responsibility for the failure of actions.83 
8. Categorizing Climate 
Burton and Obel then process the results of the measures of climate into 
four categories: group climate, developmental climate, rational goal climate, and 
internal process climate. Each category is distinct and has a best fit for the type 
of structure of the organization.  
With the above measures, the Organization for Community Engagement 
has a developmental climate. A developmental climate is characterized by high 
to medium levels of trust, low levels of conflict, high to medium levels of morale, 
high to moderate equity in giving rewards, low resistance to change, high to 
medium credibility of the leaders, and a medium level of scapegoating.84 Except 
for the difference in scapegoating, the OCE is initially determined to have a 
developmental climate.  
Burton and Obel suggest that an organization with a developmental 
climate lends to either a matrix configuration or an adhocracy. The organization 
will have a medium to low complexity in the vertical differentiation, low 
formalization, low to medium centralization, and medium span of control.  
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Additionally, the organization will conduct coordination and control through 
planning, integrators, and meetings. Finally, the organization with a 
developmental climate will have a high degree of information flow.85 
Like the previous strategic measures, identifying the climate category is a 
predictive step that helps to develop the organizational structure. After 
completion of the strategic factors analysis, the authors will input the results into 
the Organizational Consultant program. The program will analyze the results and 
suggest the structural properties that create a best fit for the Organization for 
Community Engagement. 
I. SIZE AND SKILL CAPABILITIES DOMAIN 
Size and skill capabilities play a significant role in the determination of the 
organization’s structure, the ability of the organization to collaborate and process 
information, as well as the cost to operate the organization.86 With military units 
in Afghanistan, the requirements of force protection, required capabilities, and 
size of battle space determine the size of units. Despite an increased 
sophistication, strength, and capability of the Taliban, the size or skill capabilities 
of many of the units conducting COIN operations in Afghanistan have not 
changed over the course of nine years of conflict. To reduce the amount of forces 
deployed in Afghanistan, it is necessary to use military units that have not only an 
increased information processing capability, but also improved 
professionalization/skill capabilities that can adequately deal with the 
complexities of the environment.87  
The size of the OCE must be adequate enough to deploy detachments 
and teams throughout all of Afghanistan. The lack of size and capability to cover 
down on all of Afghanistan’s 397 districts and 34 provinces severely hampers the 
                                            
85 Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit, 
152. 
86 Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit. 
87 Ibid.  
 38
ability to achieve security and legitimate local governments.88 Assuming one 
community engagement team in each district, one community engagement 
detachment per province, and a staff at the headquarter level, an initial estimate 
of the size of the OCE would be roughly 7225 personnel (based on an initial 
assumption of 15 personnel/team, 30 personnel/ detachment, and a 250 person 
CSE). 
The positions in the OCE will be manned by personnel who possess the 
correct skill set and requirements for that specific job and not based purely on 
U.S. Army personnel. It is more important to gather the correct mix of personnel 
than to stay within the confines of the U.S. Army Military Occupation Specialty 
system. Therefore, the positions will be joint and can be filled by any service. 
Additionally, the positions in the OCE can be filled by civilians from other U.S. 
governmental agencies, especially at the middle and top layer of the 
organization. The intent of such joint and interagency personnel is to find the 
right person for the job regardless of branch of service or department. 
The skill capabilities of both the members and the leaders of an 
organization play an important role in the ability of the organization to achieve 
both effectiveness and efficiency. Not only do these skill capabilities affect the 
selection of members into the organization, but they also affect the training, as 
well as technologies necessary to contribute to the success of the organization. 
The Joint Staff provides a useful way to develop the skill capabilities of an 
organization with the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The UJTL “serves as the 
foundation for capabilities-based planning across the range of military 
operations” and allow a military organization to identify the required capabilities 
to meet operational requirements and achieve mission success.89 Directly nested  
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to the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, the organizational mission and 
strategy of the OCE “establishes the requirement to perform tasks and provides 
the context for each task performance.”90  
For an organization to be successful in the complex and dynamic 
environment of COIN, it must organize and structure to accomplish a broad 
variety of not only military tasks, but additional tasks in the areas of political, 
economic, and physical development.91 Utilizing tasks outlined in UJTL, the OCE 
must be able to accomplish the following to stabilize Afghanistan successfully. 
• Provide politico-military support to other nations, groups, and 
government agencies: The OCE must be able to “provide 
assistance to other nations, groups, or government agencies that 
support strategic and operational goals” in Afghanistan.92 “This task 
includes security assistance, civil-military operations support . . . 
and other assistance from military forces to civilian authorities and 
population.”93 To accomplish this task, it is imperative that the lower 
levels of the OCE integrate with local leaders and establish 
continuous presence.94 Living among the local population in the 
village will accomplish this continuous presence. The lower levels 
of the OCE will not live and operate out of the Forward Operating 
Base (FOB). Rather, they will live among the local population in the 
village. What is good for the OCE in terms of security and basic 
services (food, water, sanitation) is also good for the village. 
• Provide security assistance and conduct civil military operations: 
The United States will not conduct COIN in Afghanistan forever. 
Therefore, it is necessary to “integrate and synchronize host-nation 
police, military internal security forces, communications 
infrastructure, and penal institutions into the [ISAF] security plan for 
the operational area.”95 Without building capacity in Afghan national 
security forces, ISAF will never achieve lasting security after pulling 
out of Afghanistan. In addition to building capacity in the ANSF, the 
OCE will also assist with the mobilization, training, equipping, and 
advising of the Civil Defense Force (CDF). The CDF will consist of 
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military-aged males from within that village. Unlike the Afghan 
National Army (ANA) and most of the Afghan National Police 
(ANP), the members of the CDF have the most at stake in creating 
a functioning community.96 Through this training, equipping, and 
advising, the OCE will emphasize the empowerment of the ANSF 
and CDF to plan and conduct direct action, raids, and other 
offensive operations targeting the Taliban. 
• Conduct Information Operations (IO) and Psychological Operations 
(PSYOPS): This task comprises “operations security, military 
deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and 
physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, in order to 
deny information, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary 
information, information-based processes, and information 
systems.”97 This combat multiplier is often both overlooked and 
under-resourced by friendly forces. Additionally, insurgent forces 
capitalize on this weakness because they can produce better 
products that reach the Afghan population faster.98 The OCE will 
attempt to correct this inefficiency and ineffectiveness by integrating 
soldiers and leaders trained in IO and PSYOP into all levels of the 
organization to not only support GIRoA, ISAF, and ANSF 
operations, but also exploit Taliban weaknesses and vulnerabilities. 
• Coordinate plans with non-DoD/inter-agency organizations and 
synchronize and integrate local operations: COIN requires the 
successful arrangement of all operations with respect to time, 
space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at 
the decisive point. This activity includes the vertical and the 
horizontal integration of tasks in time and space to maximize 
combat output. Synchronization ensures all elements of the 
operational force, including supported agencies’ and nations’ forces 
are efficiently and safely employed to maximize their combined 
effects beyond the sum of their individual capabilities.99  
The OCE will work through its higher headquarters to coordinate and 
synchronize outside organizations (USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRT), NGOs, IO, and PSYOPs) depending on the needs of each particular 
village/district. Additionally, the outside organizations will have liaisons in the 
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OCE to synchronize efforts from the OCE and the outside organizations. The 
CET will nest, coordinate, and de-conflict local operations and objectives with 
that of the higher district/ provincial/central government, as well as ISAF and 
USG objectives. The OCE will serve as the focal point for all kinetic and non-
kinetic operations taking place inside the village.  
J. TECHNOLOGY DOMAIN 
Technology is the “information, equipment, techniques, and processes 
required to transform inputs into outputs.”100 The skill level, training, and capacity 
of both the members and leaders of the organization must be directly related to 
the technology and information processing to be able to meet organizational 
goals. To measure technology, it is necessary to define the type of area the 
organization operates. The OCE is a service organization that serves not only 
U.S. government, but also a host nation client.  
The type of production in which the OCE will use is highly dependent on 
the location and the environment this location presents. The OCE must possess 
the ability to adjust the services necessary to build capacity where these services 
are lacking in the local community.  
Due to the uncertainty and the dynamic nature of the environment, the 
OCE must be able to use non-routine technology to counter problems difficult to 
resolve in the environment.  
The final way to define technology is by the divisibility, or the “the degree 
in which tasks can be divided into smaller, relatively independent tasks.”101 The 
tasks associated with defeating an insurgency are highly interdependent in that 
security can only come with the support of the population.102 While some 
divisibility exists in the tasks associated with OCE, these tasks remain highly 
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interdependent on each other. As such, the OCE must be able to conduct both 
continuous and efficient information-processing utilizing available technologies to 
transform these inputs into outputs.103  
K. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT 
As explained in Chapter II, no organization currently exists designed to 
accomplish the key counterinsurgency principles in U.S. military strategy for 
Afghanistan. The authors use OrgCon in an iterative manner to suggest a 
structure for such an organization using first the diagnosis and strategic fit 
domains as explored in this chapter.104 The resulting OrgCon analysis identifies 
possible strategic misfits and recommends a structural configuration for the 
Organization for Community Engagement.105 Chapter IV furthers explore the 
structural configuration of the Organization for Community Engagement. 
The results of the analysis of the diagnosis and strategic fit domains show 
that the initial recommendation for the best-fit structure is that of a simple 
organization, which is based solely on analysis of the strategic factors. To 
continue the design of the organization in the next chapter, the thesis authors 
had to assume an initial structure. The authors assume a matrix structure for the 
OCE because of the highly complex environment and the requirement for 
decentralization and collaboration. 
Further results of the analysis show that a strategic misfit exists in the 
organizational strategy. When measuring the strategy the OCE was identified as 
a mix of defender and prospector strategy. The OCE has five measures 
characterized by a prospector strategy and three measures characterized by a 
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defender strategy. In their book, Burton and Obel show that the combination of a 
defender and prospector strategy is an organization with a reactor strategy.106  
After conducting the initial iteration of the OrgCon analysis, the reactor 
strategy is not apparent. Thus, a disconnect seems to exist between Burton and 
Obel’s text and OrgCon because the text recommends a reactor strategy (given 
the strategy measures) and the program simply identifies a strategic misfit and 
does not recommend a reactor strategy.107 Regardless, valuable insights can be 
gleaned from the analysis. 
The analysis shows that a defender strategy is not appropriate because 
the organization cannot anticipate changes in the environment—it is not 
innovative or adaptive. The Community Engagement Concept is innovative and 
adaptable, and thus, the OrgCon analysis recommends adjusting the strategy to 
an analyzer or prospector. Due to the many environmental factors that affect the 
OCE, the analysis also recommends a possible analyzer strategy to seek out 
opportunities in the complex environment. Finally, the OrgCon initial analysis of 
the diagnosis and strategic fit domains concludes that the OCE has a 
developmental climate, which does not match with a defender strategy. Rather, a 
flexible and externally oriented developmental climate is a better fit with a 
prospector or analyzer strategy.  
In summary, the three measures of organizational strategy that supported 
a defender strategy caused an unbalanced situation between the diagnosis and 
strategic fit domains. In later analysis, the authors recommend the critical 
examination of the three measures. If there continues to be a strategic misfit, 
then it is recommended that an adjustment be made to the organizational 
strategy to support a fit between the contingency factors. 
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IV. CONTINGENCY FACTORS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As Burton and Obel state, “organizational design is the specification of 
configuration, complexity, formalization, centralization, incentives and 
coordination and control mechanisms.”108 This chapter continues with the 
organization design of the Organization for Community Engagement (OCE) by 
suggesting the possible structural configuration properties. These properties are 
based on the strategic factors as defined in the previous chapter. By creating the 
best possible strategy-structure fit for the OCE, this organization will be more 
effective, efficient, and viable in its attempt to accomplish the military strategy in 
Afghanistan successfully. This “correct balance between centralization and 
decentralization, discipline and initiative, and authority and individual 
responsibility is essential for military success.”109 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS 
Organizational configuration is a useful way to represent an organization 
visually. Often times, an organizational chart accomplishes this representation by 
specifying the various levels of the organization, division of labor, as well as the 
coordination between these levels of the organization.110 OrgCon recommends 
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matrix configuration is possible.111 However, the thesis authors assumed that the 
OCE is a matrix organization because of the hostility, complexity, and dynamic 
nature of the environment.112 
Organizations with a matrix configuration consist of divisional and 
functional hierarchies and have the customer as their primary focus.113 A matrix 
organization has the advantage of lateral and hierarchical relationships, which 
allows the organization to respond to changing and uncertain environments. 
Applied to the OCE, it has lateral relationships to the various military, 
nongovernmental, and inter-governmental organizations. Although a weakness of 
a matrix configuration is the heavy reliance on coordination and management 
time, the OCE attempts to reduce this weakness through the established 
coordination processes and delegating decision making to the lowest level. 
Sufficient personnel trained in tasks necessary in COIN increases the information 
capability of the leaders in the OCE, preventing them from becoming inundated 
with the demands of information processing and decision making. 
Virtualization is a measure of the geographical dispersion of the 
organization. The virtualization in the OCE is high because the various elements 
are geographically dispersed and thus have a high degree of spatial 
differentiation. Although each of the smaller elements in the OCE is 
asynchronously operating in remote locations with the population, they are 
networked together and share information.  
The OCE is designed around social boundaries within regions and 
populations groups rather than national boundaries. Regions and cultural groups 
are not necessarily bound by national borders, such as the tribal regions in  
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Afghanistan and Pakistan. The OCE has assets and capabilities designed to 
engage with cultural and community groups (i.e., tribes, clans) that are 
dispersed, interdependent, and specialized.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
While organizational configurations deal with the organization’s division of 
activities, organizational complexity deals with vertical and horizontal 
differentiation and the organization’s dispersion. Both the number of levels of 
authority in the lowest level of the organization, as well as the overall number of 
fundamentally different levels in the entire organization measure vertical 
differentiation. Horizontal differentiation is measured by the specialization across 
the organization in terms of education, experience, and training. Diffusion (or 
spatial differentiation) is measured in terms of number of geographic locations, 
their distance from their headquarters, and the proportion of dispersed personnel 
(versus those who remain at the headquarters).114 
An organization that has a high degree of complexity, based on those 
factors, will also have a high need for coordination and information 
dissemination, which is designed to lead to members of organizations functioning 
in a variety of roles based on the organization’s size and dispersion. As an 
example, a small organization, such as the lower level of the OCE, will require 
many specially educated, trained, and experienced personnel. It will be 
geographically distant from its headquarters, but it will have a flat organizational 
structure where leaders are functioning in a “control with” manner. Since the 
lower level of the OCE will need to interface and integrate the efforts with the 
Afghan people, Afghan governmental organizations, and U.S. or allied 
organizations, OCE members will be required to serve as liaison personnel with 
affiliated organizations, which will call for much coordination and information 
dissemination among the various stakeholders within the environment. For 
example, at the lowest level, the organization is not vertically diverse, but due to 
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the highly diverse horizontal differentiation and spatial dispersion, the 
organization is very complex. Considering this inherent complexity, the 
organization would benefit from fewer temporal restrictions based on existing 
rotation lengths (typically a maximum of one year). While the authors do not 
propose specific rotation durations, it is a given that an organization that is very 
complex should be assisted in any way with increased stability; longer durations 
of exposure to the environment and its factors, as well as a system that would 
provide for less than complete replacement of members at rotation’s end would 
assist the stability of the organization and ensure continuity within and without 
the organization. 
D. FORMALIZATION 
Formalization is the written rules in an organization. These rules allow an 
organization to achieve not only standardized behavior, but also more efficient 
operations in a specific and stable environment.115 As the fight in Afghanistan 
became a protracted engagement, the strategy and the units (including Special 
Operations Forces) have become more conventional and formalized.116 In the 
author’s opinion, this conventionalization has led to an increase in formalization 
(force protection policies, CONOP approval process) that is preventing small 
units from effectively engaging the population and building a sustainable 
indigenous solution. Military units in war operate in accordance with formally 
stated standard operating procedures (SOPs), rules of engagement (ROE), and 
the law of land warfare. However, leaders must afford military units in COIN the 
latitude to not only embrace greater risk but also apply unorthodox methods that 
comply with these stated rules and laws.  
The OCE is no different from other COIN forces operating in Afghanistan, 
which are attempting to secure the population and create not only social 
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equilibrium but also a stable government. Although it will operate in compliance 
with these standards and subsequent formalization, the OCE is designed to 
operate with increased initiative and freedom of action. In his recent COIN 
guidance, General Petraeus acknowledged the importance of freedom of action 
by stating that “in the absence of guidance or orders, figure out what the orders 
should have been and execute them.” The OCE will have skilled and 
experienced members and allow them the freedom to utilize judgment and 
intuition to “adapt to changing circumstances, exploit fleeting opportunities, 
respond to developing problems, modify schemes, or redirect efforts.”117 
E. CENTRALIZATION 
Centralization is the “degree to which formal authority to make 
discretionary choices is concentrated in an individual, unit, or level.”118 This 
structural property is measured by the amount of direct involvement by the top 
leadership in gathering and interpreting information.  
Historically, units in the U.S. military operate with very high centralization. 
Commanders issue guidance to their subordinates and approve their unit’s 
operations. Unfortunately, insurgents maintain the operational initiative, which 
thereby, causes the environment to be highly uncertain and complex.119 Several 
countries learned through their COIN experiences that this centralized decision-
making and approval of operations makes it difficult to counter the elusive 
insurgent. The British in Malaysia, French in Indochina, and the Portuguese in 
Mozambique all recognized this organizational weakness when trying to defeat 
an insurgency, and they adjusted their organizational structure to have small-
units trained and equipped for COIN conducting decentralized operations.120  
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Despite these historical lessons learned in countering an insurgency, the 
U.S. military continues to operate in Afghanistan with centralized decision-
making, as well as a concept of the operation (CONOP) approval process.121 
“U.S. military operations may be more likely to succeed when leaders at the 
small-unit level have enough leeway, specialized assets, and firepower to 
engage the population.”122 The commander of ISAF (COMISAF), General 
Petraeus, recently published his counterinsurgency guidance to “flatten reporting 
chains (while maintaining hierarchical decision chains).”123 Additionally, 
COMISAF recommended to his leaders that they “enable decentralized action” 
and “push assets and authorities down to those who most need them and can 
actually use them.”124 Despite this guidance, ISAF still requires general officer 
approval and at least 48 hours of notice to conduct any operation targeting the 
Taliban insurgency or taking place at night.125 This level of approval and amount 
of notice is not appropriate in a war where the insurgent chooses where and 
when to engage its opponent. Therefore, ISAF and the U.S. military require 
additional organizational and cultural change to decentralize decision making. As 
RAND’s Seth Jones points out, organizational configuration in COIN works well 
when it is “flattened out from a hierarchical to a more horizontal level. The shorter 
links are from sensor-to-shooter, the better they work. Quicker and more 
responsive arrangements for command and control provide flexibility for forces 
on the battlefield.”126 
Another factor contributing to centralization in units in Afghanistan is risk 
aversion and force protection. Journalist Mark Moyar has argued that “in the late 
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20th century, the Army gravitated toward standardization, as peacetime militaries 
often do, and consequently rewarded the … officers who are now the Army’s 
generals and colonels. But this personality type functions less well in activities 
that change frequently or demand regular risk-taking, like technological 
development or counterinsurgency.”127 Unfortunately, “the American military's 
conventional mindset, magnified by misperceptions of the American public's 
casualty intolerance, has allowed force-protection to trump mission 
accomplishment in the execution of counterinsurgency operations in 
Afghanistan.”128 The result is that military leaders at higher levels are preventing 
the initiative of their junior officers through centralization, micromanagement and 
policies to reduce risk and casualties.129 While this centralization and the 
corresponding risk-averse and force protection policies (requiring up-armored 
vehicles, operating from FOBs, and use of heavy firepower) prevent the loss of 
friendly forces, they separate the counterinsurgent “physically or psychologically 
from the populace that they are supposed to be engaging and protecting” and 
limit their prospects of success in COIN.130 
For the OCE to be successful in the dynamic and uncertain conditions of 
COIN, it must adopt a decentralized organizational configuration. Thus, the OCE 
would empower its “leaders to deal with the challenges encountered during 
counterinsurgency operations, including the authority to make routinely decisions  
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currently made by battalion and brigade combat team commanders.”131 Although 
a change to more decentralized decision-making is at first painful in terms of 
casualties, “in the long run it will save lives and shorten wars.”132 
F. INCENTIVES 
Incentives are the way in which the organization evaluates and 
compensates its members. All organizations use systems of rewards to ensure a 
positive relationship between member behaviour and organization strategy. 
Burton and Obel indicate that organizations can choose incentive strategies 
based on individual behaviour, individual results, group behaviour, or group 
results. Few organizations have a pure incentive strategy. Instead; they use a 
mixture of strategies with a tendency to emphasize one incentive strategy overall. 
For an organization that has a matrix structure and reactor strategy (a 
combination of defender and prospector) one would tend to provide incentives to 
members in the three following ways.133 
First, members would receive incentives based on two factors: the 
development of the individual skills that have been identified as being crucial to 
the success of the organization; and the member’s performance of prescribed 
tasks associated with their specific role or job. Members of the OCE would 
continue to be evaluated using the current military evaluation systems while 
being given rewards, either in associated monetary compensation or 
certifications and educational degrees, based on advancement in skills that 
would benefit the organizations goals, such as language, cultural studies, written 
communications, or the use of information technology.  
Second, members would be promoted based on their ability to interact 
with the environment, instead of solely on rank or temporal seniority. For the 
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OCE, members would be promoted to positions of leadership based not only on 
seniority or rank, but also on their abilities to interact with the population and 
perform tasks in support of the OCE’s goals. Those members who have 
succeeded because of their abilities to understand the cultural subtleties needed 
to be successful would be promoted to positions of higher responsibility 
regardless of military rank. While rapport is difficult to measure, leaders must 
make constant assessments of their team members’ abilities to successfully 
interact with their counterparts. 
Lastly, although individual performance and evaluations are the basis for 
the incentives and rewards, rewards based on organizational performance would 
be emphasized over those of individual performance. The various elements of 
the OCE could be rewarded based on external measures of effectiveness that 
would be derived from their ability to achieve the national goals. Members would 
be provided with opportunities for military rewards, education, or temporary pay 
incentives. The organization would tend toward incentives based on group 
results as this would foster a team environment and a desire to place group 
achievements over individual achievements.  
Overall, the implementation of an organization’s incentives should align 
with its organizational goals, strategy, and structure. When a misfit exists 
between these elements and the incentives within an organization, an emphasis 
on the individual can develop as opposed to the team with internal 
competitiveness that could lead to disunity and the failure of meeting the 
organization’s goals. The OCE requires an incentive structure “…that allows for 
initiative at the lowest level is likely [as it is more likely] to be superior to one that 
does not.”134 
G. COORDINATION AND CONTROL  
Coordination and control is the way an organization integrates its 
operations to achieve its common goals. All of the organizational configurations 
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discussed in the proceeding paragraphs all contribute towards the organization 
obtaining coordination and control. Military organizations utilize the term 
command and control (C2), to define this very important function. C2 is an 
“interactive process . . . to ensure that the force as a whole can adapt 
continuously to changing requirements.”135 A related component of C2 is unity of 
effort. Unity of effort is “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, 
even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or 
organization—the product of successful unified action.”136 General Petraeus 
understands the importance of unity of effort on the success in Afghanistan by 
recognizing that addressing the challenges and threats in Afghanistan “requires a 
comprehensive, whole of government approach that fully integrates our military 
and non-military efforts and those of our allies and partners. This approach puts 
a premium on unity of effort at all levels and with all participants.”137 In this type 
of multination, multiagency fight, “no single activity . . . is more important than 
command and control” and unity of effort.138 The COIN efforts in Afghanistan 
require “getting the multiple international organizations, dozens of nations, 
numerous development organizations, myriad U.S. departments and agencies, 
and even diverse U.S. military units to pull in the same direction is a monumental 
challenge.”139 Unfortunately, this type of synchronization and cooperation is not 
taking place.140 “International aid organizations, global media, non-government 
organizations and religious leaders are critical for success,” yet operate on their 
own agenda outside of ISAF’s control.141 Even between ISAF and the U.S. 
                                            
135 Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Wafare, 104. 
136 Joint Publication (JP) 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2009), 576. 
137 David Petraues, "Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Review," Senate Armed Services Committee, April 1, 2009, 
http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/April/Petraeus%2004-01-09.pdf. 
138 Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Wafare, 103. 
139 Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, "Unity of Effort," Strategic Forum 248 
(October 2009): 2. 
140 Based off authors’ experience in Afghanistan with organizational competition between not 
only conventional and SOF units, but also within SOF. 
141 David Kilcullen, "Counter-insurgency Redux," Survival 48, no. 4 (2006): 113. 
 55
military, a lack of unity of effort occurs due to lack of coordination, conflicting 
missions (counterterrorism vs. counterinsurgency), a competition for resources, 
and confusing chains of command.142  
Due to the high equivocality, complexity, and uncertainty in the 
environment in Afghanistan, the command and control of the OCE should 
comprise a combination of planning and forecasting, combined with integrators 
(liaisons) to maximize the coordination and synchronization of operations.143 By 
enabling the local leaders to develop the local security forces, the OCE will help 
the community to provide a safe and secure environment for reconstruction and 
development.144 The OCE will help coordinate and synchronize reconstruction 
and development, as well as leverage available assets and programs and, while 
the OCE does not formally own the battle space, operations from other 
organizations will be deconflicted to ensure unity of effort. 
H. ORGCON ANALYSIS 
The above design fit measures were designed into the organizational 
consultant program.145 The measures are built upon the diagnosis and strategic 
fit domains measures from Chapter III. This second iteration of OrgCon allowed 
the authors to analyze the development of the OCE further. In addition to a 
general analysis, OrgCon identifies the strategic misfits, the contingency misfits, 
and shows the organizational characteristics. Additionally, the analysis provides 
recommendations on removing the misfits. 
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1. Strategic Misfit 
As identified in the analysis of the strategic factors, the OCE continues to 
have a reactor strategy. However, OrgCon is limited in the analysis because it is 
not designed to take into account a reactor strategy, and instead shows a 
strategic misfit with the partial defender strategy.146  
2. Contingency Misfit 
Because of its external focus and flexibility, the OCE has a developmental 
climate. OrgCon indicates that the developmental climate is a misfit with the 
defender strategy. As stated previously, the OCE has a combination of the 
defender and prospector strategies. This combination creates a reactor strategy. 
As the developmental climate is a misfit with the defender strategy, the 
prospector strategy should be emphasized more in the design. Additionally, the 
developmental climate is a misfit with a large organization because a large 
organization tends to be complex and formalized. As such, during the design of 
the OCE, it is important to keep the complexity and formalization measures 
low.147 
3. OrgCon Recommendations 
With a certainty factor of 82%, OrgCon recommends a simple 
configuration. However, it also recommends a matrix configuration with a 
certainty factor of 67 percent. It shows that it does not have a divisional 
configuration because the organization has tasks and technology that are not 
divisible.148 Also, it does not have a machine bureaucracy configuration because 
the organization operates in a hostile environment.  
The recommended organizational characteristics are low horizontal and 
vertical differentiations, low formalization, and high centralization. Finally, it is 
                                            




recommended that incentives be based on group and individual results. The 
majority of the current misfits are created because the OrgCon program does not 
combine the defender and prospector strategies into a reactor strategy. Thus, it 
defaults to the recommended defender strategy, and therefore, determines 
several inaccurate misfits. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
President Obama has laid out the goals for the United States in 
Afghanistan. Those goals have been impacted by the duration the United States 
has been involved in the conflict, the nation’s expenditure of blood and treasure, 
and the seeming lack of success of U.S. and coalition efforts in Afghanistan since 
2001. The question remains: can the United States succeed in Afghanistan [and 
elsewhere] by making structural adaptations to the existing organizations within 
the Department of Defense or by creating new organizations whose structure is a 
better fit to the nation’s security strategy?  
A potential answer can be derived from the authors’ analysis of the current 
military strategy in Afghanistan, its goals, and the recommended structural fit of 
an organization that would match those strategies and goals. Within this analysis, 
the authors identify that the Organization for Community Engagement (OCE) 
should be either a simple or matrix configuration. The simple configuration has a 
relatively flat hierarchy and can be the best fit for a hostile environment. 
However, the simple organization is not as functionally capable as a matrix 
configuration, which has two interconnected levels—one level manages functions 
of the OCE and the other level manages the partitions of the OCE. After 
analyzing the OrgCon outputs, the matrix configuration presents the best fit 
configuration for the OCE because of the many different functions required and 
the many different divisions focused on the various cultural elements.149 
A. LIMITATIONS OF ORGCON 
While providing a substantial amount of insight and analysis into the 
suggested organizational design of the OCE, the OrgCon program has several 
limitations.150 The first is that the program is unable to recommend a reactor 
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strategy for an organization. Burton and Obel’s text explains that a combination 
of the defender strategy and the prospector strategy is a reactor strategy.151 Of 
the eight measures described in Burton and Obel’s book, five were categorized 
as defender strategy and three as prospector. Consequently, the analysis 
derived from the text recommends a reactor strategy while maintaining more 
characteristics of a defender strategy than a prospector strategy. After 
conducting the computer-based analysis, OrgCon identified the OCE as having 
an organizational strategy misfit between a defender and a prospector strategy. It 
was unable to account for the reactor strategy, and thus, the analysis was biased 
due an inability to include recommendations based on the reactor strategy. 
A second limitation of OrgCon is that it analyzes an organization at a 
single point in time and does not account for temporal variables, such as a 
changing environment, political dynamics, and so forth. Though it is a less 
obvious limitation, this single point in time analysis, if improperly understood, can 
yield conflicting results due to its inability to analyze the OCE as it becomes more 
effective in the local communities and the environment subsequently becomes 
less uncertain and less hostile. Out of necessity, the OCE will require the 
flexibility in design that enables it to adjust its structure for the changing 
environment and continued temporal factors. OrgCon is unable to predict a 
structural evolution of the organization as it adapts to the environment. 
A third limitation is that the program was primarily designed to analyze 
business organizations. The authors translated the input questions to adapt it to 
a military organization. Justifications were provided for input questions and 
answers they felt required more clarification. A possible error in the OrgCon 
analysis may stem from inaccurate translations of input questions from business 
to military terminology. 
A final limitation of OrgCon is the program’s inability to analyze different 
levels of an organization. It assumes that each level of the organization shares 
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the same qualities, such as complexity, formalization, or centralization. The 
OrgCon model is adept at analyzing organizations at one level. However, there 
are no rules specified in OrgCon with respect to misfits between dimensions or 
the configurations at different organizational levels. OrgCon was designed to 
analyze whole, and generally, larger, organizations and not parts of 
organizations, therefore the program is unable to analyze the top, middle and 
bottom layers of an organization simultaneously. The program’s assumption is 
that the entire organization shares the same qualities. This makes design of the 
OCE additionally complex because the various layers may have different 
configurations. The authors recommend the use of future versions of OrgCon 
that may allow for concurrent analysis of the nested levels of the organization in 
order to determine a refined solution. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
As Burton and Obel state through the use of a quote by Herbert A. Simon, 
Nobel Laureate on artificial intelligence: “organizational diagnoses and design is 
a normative science that focuses on creating an organization to obtain given 
goals. Design ‘is concerned with how things ought to be, with devising structures 
to attain goals.’”152  
When attempting to create an organization whose structure is derived 
from the organization’s intended goals and, therefore, provides the best fit among 
the organization’s goals, strategy, and structure, it can be helpful to remove the 
restraints of using only existing organizational structures. When using the latter 
as a basis for a new organization’s design, the best that can be achieved is the 
industry average while attempting to force-fit that legacy structure with a changed 
environment or goals. As R. L. Heneman argues in reference to rewards or 
incentives and their impact on an organization’s ability to achieve above the 
industry standard:  
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Reward system design is most often guided by best practice 
surveys or normative models established by the compensation 
profession. [However,] this practice of imitating reward systems of 
other organizations benefits those organizations that intend to use 
reward system practices to move [organization] performance from 
below average to average performance. On the other hand,, 
companies need to create unique reward systems (and Human 
Resource practices) in order to use reward systems to drive 
company performance to above the industry average.153  
Like Burton and Obel, R. L. Heneman continues to conclude, “in order for 
organizations to perform successfully, the business strategy, organizational 
structure, and reward systems must align with one another.”154 It can be simply 
stated that the internally focused bureaucratic tendencies of government 
organizations may not have the best fit in the COIN environment, and are 
therefore, less effective than would be a matrix structured organization formed to 
address the unique issue. If all insurgency is local and all locales are unique, the 
organizations utilized to address those problems may benefit from refined 
internal systems and a less cumbersome, centralized, and formalized 
organizational structure. The matrix organization creates the context that allows 
leaders of decentralized organizations the flexibility that then empowers them as 
decision makers. The current, centralized military bureaucracy is inherently 
cumbersome and thus it is recommended that the OCE has a matrix 
configuration. Therefore, the overall policy recommendation is to match the 
organization’s structure and reward systems with the intended goals and 
strategy. 
C. A CRITICAL AREA FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The following questions address important factors that affect the 
implementation of a community engagement concept not explored in this thesis.  
 
                                            




They suggest further study to better explore options for dealing with the 
mismatch of a dynamic, decentralized, matrix organization that could currently 
reside within a more static, centralized, bureaucracy. 
• Can a matrix organization fit within, or be subordinate to, a military 
bureaucracy? 
Examples of organizations with bureaucratic structures and defender 
strategies exist that have sub organizations with matrix structures and prospector 
or analyzer strategies. Heneman uses the example of the State of Ohio School 
System and its Information Technology (IT) sub-organization.155 To give the IT 
organization the flexibility to install and then best use the emerging technology, 
legislation was passed that gave it freedom from the typical bureaucratic 
constraints present within the remainder of the school system’s organizations. 
The IT organization was allowed to pursue a prospector strategy that was less 
risk averse and more open to innovation as long as the school system 
determined it was still serving the organization’s goals.  
This example could find parallels in the Department of Defense structure 
where, as long as the OCE was pursuing the nation’s military strategy, it would 
be able to have unique internal structures, reward systems, and strategies. 
However, this may necessitate an eighth uniformed service able to create 
structures not required to be mirrored within the existing seven services as are 
the present reward systems and structures. This organization could reward 
collaboration with other governmental and non-governmental agencies through 
non-traditional incentive structures and promotion systems, establish a unique 
assessment and selection program for the individual skills and personality traits 
that would fit best with the organization’s goals, and continue to adapt to the 
environments it was created to address. 
                                            




The authors have attempted to develop a better means with which the 
U.S. Government and its military can develop organizations based on its stated 
national security goals and military strategy. Although this thesis primarily 
focuses on the current operations in Afghanistan, it is possible to utilize this 
design heuristic to design units that can deploy in support of U.S. interests 
throughout the world without major changes to current manning, budget, or force 
levels.  
The following quote indicates that the U.S. defense establishment is 
beginning to realize it needs to adapt its thinking. However, based on the 
authors’ analysis, the reoccurring error is the use of existing “formations” to 
address a changed environment for which those organizations were not originally 
designed.  
…as commander of the 1st Armored Division in 1999 to 2001, [I] 
thought that if a division could handle conventional war it could 
handle anything below it on the scale of conflict. After 32 months in 
Iraq, I don’t believe that anymore. [I now] believe the Army has to 
posture itself and train to operate across the spectrum. In 2008, the 
Army came out with a new full-spectrum doctrine that said [existing] 
Army formations will simultaneously “apply offense, defense and 
stability operations to seize the initiative and achieve the desired 
results. —General George W. Casey Jr. (May 7, 2010)156 
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APPENDIX A. MINZTBERG ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN THEORY  
A. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN THEORY—MINTZBERG 
Combat conditions create an inherently complex-unstable environment, 
which is especially true of the current situation of Afghanistan. Conventional 
military units have to react at a moment’s notice to the changing environment. 
Congruent with organizational contingency theory, the organization must change 
its structure to meet uncertainty. During peacetime, military elements operate as 
machine bureaucracies; when operating in the simple-stable environment, the 
military relies on centralization and standardization of work processes to 
establish base-line procedures. As demonstrated by the development of doctrine, 
policy, and guidelines, standardization allows the operating core at the bottom of 
the organization to transition easily to de-centralized operations when the 
environment changes from simple-stable to complex-unstable.  
Mintzberg’s configurational models are valuable for analyzing military 
organizations. Military organizations in combat tend to change their structure and 
modes of coordination by task organizing for specific missions, whereas machine 
bureaucracies tend to resist organizational change. The OCE, by contrast, is 
designed to adapt to its relevant environment. As such, while the upper level of 
this organization will remain in Mintzberg’s “divisional” configuration, the lower 
level of the organization can conduct steady state operations as a “machine 
bureaucracy,” rapidly task organize for a specific mission as an “adhocracy,” then 
quickly return to a “machine bureaucracy.” This design agility is a necessary 
capability of a military organization in a complex-unstable combat environment. 
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• Standardization of Skills
• Operating Core
• Complex & Stable
• Much specialization       
(horizontal)
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Work Processes
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• Simple & Stable
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• Standardization of Outputs
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OrganicDirect Supervision Mutual Adjustment
Standard Work Process Standard Skills
Operating Core
• Produces products & services
• Transforms inputs to outputs
Technical Support
• Adapts organization to environment
• Designs the standards
• Creates innovations in the core
Staff Support
• Ensures smooth operation & upkeep
• Supports physical & human elements
Strategic Apex
• Provides direction & strategies





• Job Specialization: degree to which tasks are 
subdivided into separate jobs. If high, workers have 
range of tasks; If low, workers do diff tasks
• Vertical Decentralization: Delegation of power down 
the chain of authority.
• Horizontal Decentralization: The shift of power from 
managers to non-managers (or more exactly, from 
line managers to staff managers, analysts, support 
specialists and operators)
• Mechanistic/Bureaucratic: Fits stable external 
environment; relies on standardization (imposition 
of operating instructions, job descriptions, rules, 
SOPs); relatively inflexible, can be efficient & 
reliable.
• Organic: Fits unstable environments; Informal &  
looser; can be adaptive & innovative.
• Formalization:  Quantity of written rules in the 
organization.
• Simple vs. Complex environments: number and 
dissimilarity of external elements relevant to 
problems org faces (to ops). Complex: many 
diverse, interdependent external elements;  Simple: 
few external, independent elements
• Stable vs. Unstable environments: whether 
elements in the environment are dynamic or 
turbulent.  Stable: same over months or years; 
Unstable: shifts abruptly.
• Structural Forms:                           
Functional: activities grouped by common function 
(all engineers in engineering department)  
Divisional: organized according to products or 
organizational outputs; divided by geography, 
product, or customer                                       
Matrix: dual chain simultaneously emphasizes 
function and product
As few as 3-4 similar external 
factors influence the org
Many diverse external factors 






















































































All organizations rely on all modes of coordination, but one type and one part becomes dominant in 
one organization.  Each mechanism can be effective (e.g., effective leadership, consistent, well-
thought out rules, quality training and education, skilled teamwork) or ineffective.
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• Implements & 
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Figure 2.   Graphic of Mintzberg Configurations and Key Organizational Design Definitions 
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B. BOUNDARY SPANNING ROLES 
Due to the complexity and instability of the environment, the organizational 
design demands roles that span various boundaries. As such, organic to the 
design are roles with links and coordination to many external organizations. The 
primary concern of boundary spanning roles is with the exchange of information. 
The individuals on the community engagement detachments and teams will 
utilize their boundary spanning roles to leverage all pertinent organizations, both 
in the WOG and in the GIRoA. A secondary concern is with the exchange of 
physical support (money, equipment, supplies, etc.). This second order effect of 
the boundary spanning roles encourages organizational momentum, which is 
critical for new organizations in a highly bureaucratized military machine. Further 
horizontal and vertical spanning will occur at every level with other elements 
conducting the same type of missions. These informal relationships will develop 
communities of practice and will serve as a medium for exchanging task, 
techniques, and procedures for successfully executing the community 
engagement mission.  
C. BUFFERING ROLES 
A few buffering roles exist in the organizational design of the OCEs. Some 
job positions serve as buffers to the external environment in the highest level 
(strategic apex) and the mid-level. Built into the organic structure, these buffering 
roles are designed to absorb uncertainty from the general environment and the 
military organizational culture writ large. In time, at the lowest level, the OCE 
becomes in tune with the village leaders, and thus, the environmental uncertainty 
eventually declines. 
D. COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE  
Communities of practice are essentially similar groups of people who are 
engaged in similar work. These groups, although separate and distinct, share 
insights, lessons learned, and experiences to better learn and develop their 
situations. Although organized and focused on a different customer base (i.e., 
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Pashtun, Uzbek, Tajik, etc.), OCEs share the same organizational strategy and 
mission. This leads to the necessity of communities of practice. Through 
communication with each other, the OCEs will learn from each other’s 
experiences and collectively develop their organization to impact their 
environment better. 
E. DYNAMIC TENSION 
Due to the constantly evolving tasks, technology, and people, an 
underlying current of dynamic tension exists between the organizational structure 
and the environment. Schoonhoven and Jelinek, in their article, “Dynamic 
Tension in Innovative, High Technology Firms,” explore the interaction between 
organizational efficiency and flexibility.157 The OCE is designed at the highest 
level to have continuity, control, and integration while at the bottom level to have 
flexibility and adaptability. It is designed to manage the dynamic tension between 
systemic structure with clear responsibilities and the ability to be flexible and 
reorganize according to environmental changes. 
F. OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES 
The OCE will produce numerous benefits. The organization will 
demonstrate to the local populace America’s resolve and commitment because 
they will be living with the tribe or village. The OCE will be able to provide real 
time information in previously denied areas. Providing a long-term presence 
capability and professional development mechanism will be the cornerstone for 
operations conducted by the CEC.  
As the OCE develops and matures, measurable effects to evaluate 
stability will occur. These effects will come in the form of increased services 
provided to the community or an increase in the number of jobs within the district. 
                                            
157 Claudia Bird Schoonhoven and Marian Jelinik, "Dynamic Tension in Innovative, High 
Technology Firms: Managing Rapid Technological Change Through Organizational Structure," in 
Managing Complexity in High Technology Organizations,ed. Mary Ann Glinow and Susan Alberse 
Mohrman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 99. 
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Overall, the most important measurable effect will be the change in security of 
the local population. This change of security can be determined simply by 
measuring the interaction of the AAF with the local population.  
 70
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 71
APPENDIX B. COMPLETE ORGCON QUESTIONNAIRE158  
                                            
158 Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The 















APPENDIX C. AFGHANISTAN’S STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
A. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
A large number of stakeholders with competing goals operate in 
Afghanistan. Therefore, a stakeholder approach is useful to analyze the 

















Figure 3.   Depiction of Stakeholders in the Central Asian States160 
Examining the stakeholders in Afghanistan shows that a myriad of 
interested parties exist that wield significant influence. Most importantly, the 
success of any population centric military operation relies heavily on the support 
of the population.  
                                            
159 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design. 8th ed. (Mason, Ohio: 
Thompson South-Western, 1997), 204. 
160 Task Force Phoenix, Ethnolinguistic Map of Afghanistan, 
http://web.mit.edu/cis/fpi_afghanistan.html#Maps. 
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1. U.S. Population 
For long-term, continual engagement by the CEC elements, the U.S. 
population must be supportive of the COIN struggle in Afghanistan.161 Support 
from the U.S. population is relative; it is likely that they will not be decisively 
supportive or unsupportive of the OCE unless catastrophic success or failure 
occurs, which can be influenced by strategic communications. In real terms, 
since the lowest level of the OCE is, by design, living with the local population 
and making minimal overt impact, they are not going to be highlighted by U.S. 
media outlets. The opposite is equally true. If the OCE became publicly 
highlighted, the U.S. public opinion would be impacted; strategic communications 
play an important and continual role in stakeholder analysis. The U.S. population 
is an important stakeholder because they indirectly have the power to ‘pull the 
plug’ on any community engagement initiative.  
2. Afghan Population 
The Afghan population is the key stakeholder. A community will ultimately 
decide whether to support the OCE. If the community supports the OCE and a 
relationship develops, then the community, as a stakeholder, allows—passively 
or actively—the OCE to accomplish its mission. Trust, past experiences, or 
influence of Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) are a few examples of variables that could 
affect the tribal sheikhs, village elders, or mullahs’ decision to support the OCE. If 
the community chooses not to support the OCE, it may prevent the OCE from 
accomplishing its mission; the OCE would not be able to live with the population, 
develop relationships with the community elders, develop and enable a Civil 
Defense Force (CDF), or leverage coalition and GIRoA support and 
representation. The OCE would be forced to reengage in another manner, 
redesign their approach, or choose a different community with which to partner;  
 
 
                                            
161 Afghanistan: Country Outlook, July 1, 2009, http://viewswire.eiu.com. 
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the targeted local community is the customer. As the customer, the community 
element is the critical stakeholder and has the final decision on whether or not to 
support the OCE. 
3. U.S. Government 
The U.S. Government (USG) is responsible to the U.S. population. The 
international legitimacy of the USG’s war on terror is at stake. The USG is 
inherently interested in succeeding. The community engagement concept will 
assist in the accomplishment of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.162 Internal to the 
USG are the stakeholders that comprise the Whole of Government (WOG).163 
The WOG provides the OCEs with various non-DoD personnel while using the 
OCE as a conduit to provide the Afghan population with support and resources. 
The WOG will be encouraged to provide expert personnel to the Community 
Engagement Detachments/ Teams.164  
4. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
Two additional stakeholders are the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the U.S. Government. The GIRoA is attempting to 
establish itself as the legitimate government in Afghanistan. The GIRoA is a 
stakeholder in any level of community engagement. It will use any and all efforts 
to build inroads into local level communities and establish legitimacy. On the 
other hand, some members of the GIRoA are corrupt and possibly allied with 
enemy elements. 165 These members could use the community engagement 
concept as another means to further their corruption. 
                                            
162 This claim is based on assumptions that the Community Engagement Concept will be 
adequately resourced and implemented and accomplishes the key success factors. 
163 The term Whole of Government is used to refer to all agencies under the United States 
Government. To name a few, it is used to refer to the Department of Defense (DoD), Department 
of State (DoS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
164 United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (ICI), 2009, 
http://www.usgcoin.org/index.cfm. 
165 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance Security, and U.S. Policy 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2009). 
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5. Border Nations 
The community engagement concept employs a regionally based 
organization designed to be tailored for worldwide environments. Applied to 
Afghanistan, the various border nations, such as Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, and China, are also stakeholders. 
These border countries have a stake in the establishment of a functioning state in 
Afghanistan. Historically, communities in Afghanistan do not adhere to district, 
provincial, or national boundaries. The ethnic groups, super tribes, and tribal 
elements flow throughout the porous regional borders. This creates complexity 
when ISAF, USG, and ANSF are organized by provincial boundaries. Currently, it 
is necessary to gain permission from various battle space owners to conduct 
reconstruction projects or key leader engagements focusing on a tribe or ethnic 
group that lives close to a provincial boundary. There is a high cost of 
coordination, which creates additional bureaucracy and limits organizational 
flexibility. 
6. Enemy Forces 
Finally, the Anti-Afghan Forces are an undeniable stakeholder in the 
community engagement concept. The AAF is fighting for its survival. Although 
the forces that compose the AAF are diverse and complex, the AAF is fighting as 
a neo-classical insurgency. They are fighting primarily an indirect strategy 
against the Coalition Forces (CF). Their goal is to gain and maintain control over 
the population. The community engagement concept counters the indirect 
strategy of the AAF with an indirect strategy of community engagement. 
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APPENDIX D. TEMPORAL DEPICTION OF UNIFIED JOINT TASK LIST FOR OCE166 
                                            
166 Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit, 3rd ed. (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2004). 
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APPENDIX E. ORGCON —DIAGNOSIS AND STRATEGIC FIT 
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APPENDIX F. ORGCON—DIAGNOSIS AND STRATEGIC FIT 
OUTPUT ANALYSIS168 
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